NSF SECURE Center
Research Security Briefing
Vol. 2, No. 21
June 12, 2026
The NSF SECURE Center distributes research security briefings and timely alerts via its listserv. The Briefing provides a centralized resource for research security-related information, including new statutory and research funding agency requirements, new or updated federal and community resources, and significant news items and scholarly works. The Center will also assess and provide commentary, interpretation, or implementation considerations on new requirements, notices and resources, working with higher education associations, legal partners, or agencies as needed.
Briefing Contents
Professional Association Resources & Reports
NSF SECURE Center Opportunities, Updates & Resources
-
Hear What Participants are Saying about the NSF SECURE Center Mentorship Program
-
Registration Open: SPARK + FBI Webinar: China’s Virtual Targeting Strategy: What You Need to Know
-
SPARK + FBI Webinar: China - Technology Transfer Threat Through Recruitment and Talent Plans
-
REMINDER: Your input is needed - NSF SECURE Center community survey (15-20 minutes)
-
Trending Topics in the Shared Virtual Environment (SVE) Discussion Forum
Federal News & Updates
Department of War Issues Updated 1260H List
On June 8, 2026, the Department of War (DOW) issued an updated version of the list of “Chinese military companies” DOW is required to maintain under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.
As noted in Research Security Briefing vol. 2, no. 9, the March 9, 2026 version of DOW’s “Component Decision Matrix to Inform Fundamental Research Proposal Mitigation Decisions” includes the notice that institutions of higher education may not use DoW funds for grants, contracts or other transactions for the purpose of conducting fundamental research in collaboration with or using equipment from any entity named on a “Prohibited Entity List,” including the 1260H List.
Newly added Parent Entities include:
-
Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba)
-
Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd. (Autel Technology) — note: Autel Robotics was already listed; the parent Autel Technology is new
-
Baidu, Inc.
-
BOE Technology Group Company Limited
-
BYD Company Limited
-
CALB Group Co., Ltd.
-
EVE Energy Co., Ltd.
-
Hangzhou Yushu Technology Co., Ltd. (Unitree)
-
Hesai Group
-
JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd.
-
NIO, Inc.
-
Novogene Company Limited
-
Robosense Technology Co., Ltd.
-
Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd.
-
TP-Link Technologies Co., Ltd.
-
Trina Solar Co., Ltd.
-
WuXi AppTec Co., Ltd.
-
Zhongji Innolight Co., Ltd. (Innolight)
New Subsidiaries added under existing Parent Entities include:
-
Under AVIC: Align Aerospace LLC, Cirrus Design Corporation, Continental Aerospace Technologies Inc., AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co.
-
Under BGI Group: BGI Americas Corporation, Complete Genomics, GBI Diagnostics, Innomics Inc., STOmics Americas Ltd.
-
Under CCCG: CCCC Design and Consulting Group, CCCC Second/Third Navigation Engineering Bureaus, China Transportation Materials, Shanghai Zhenhua Shipping, ZPMC North America
-
Under China Mobile: Aspire Technologies, China Mobile Hong Kong (BVI)
-
Under China SpaceSat: Aerospace Star Space Technology Application Co., Beijing Meiya Hongshu Technology
-
Under China Telecom: New Guomai Digital Culture, Tianyi Cloud Technology, Zhongjie Communications
-
Under China Unicom: Beijing Telecom Planning and Designing Institute
-
Under Norinco: Chinese Academy of Ordnance Science, Kiekert USA, Merit Automotive Electronics Systems, North Petroleum International, Yunnan Yuanjin Optical Instrument
-
Under SMIC: SDIC/Meiya entities reorganized; Beijing Meiya Hongshu added
-
Under CSGC: Beijing Beiji Mechanical and Electrical Industry, Changan US R&D Center, China South Industries No. 59 Research Institute, Sichuan Jian'an Industry
USDA Issues Revised Terms & Conditions
Effective June 3, 2026, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued Deviation #2026-USDA-0001-F, revising its General Terms and Conditions for Federal Awards (originally effective December 31, 2025), with key changes to research security provisions.
The June 3 revisions include the following updates to definitions in Section 10.0, Research & Development, Science & Technology:
-
Covered individual: Previously the Terms and Conditions (T&Cs) included referenced “individual(s) employed to work on the award”, e.g., with respect to training certification. The revised T&Cs replace “individual" with “covered individual.” However, whereas other agencies specify this term refers to senior/key personnel, USDA states that the term refers to an individual who meets the following criteria:
Contributes to the scientific development or execution of research, carried out as part of this USDA award, through any of the following responsibilities:
Directing the overall scientific direction of the project; Designing or critically evaluating key experiments or methodologies; Interpreting primary research data or results; Serving as a primary or senior author on publications resulting from the project; Exercising direct supervisory authority over research personnel working on the research project; or Generating, handling, or having direct access to primary, pre-publication research data; proprietary materials; or critical, specialized methodologies essential to the project’s execution.”
Of note, this term can include undergraduate, graduate, or postdoctoral students. As such, USDA provides greater specificity while continuing to expand the definition of covered individual under specified conditions, including “any other individual USDA specifically identifies in writing as a covered individual.”
-
Foreign individual: Now explicitly includes lawful permanent residents within the category of non-foreign persons.
-
Foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI):Replaces the prior "U.S. citizen or entity subject to FOCI" definition, reframing FOCI in terms of risk to non-public research information.The revised “FOCI” is defined as:
“a situation where the degree of ownership, control, or influence over the recipient or a covered individual by a foreign person or foreign entity that is a citizen or permanent resident of; representing; organized, chartered, or incorporated under the laws of; or otherwise substantially connected to a foreign adversary or foreign country of concern such that a reasonable basis exists for concluding that compromise to that foreign person or foreign entity of non-public research, development, scientific, or technological information associated with the Federal award may result.”
-
Foreign interest: A new addition to Section 10.0 that had previously appeared as a footnote, defined as "a foreign person or foreign entity,".
Additional revisions include updates to terms and conditions pertaining to:
-
10.6 Research Security Training
-
In the revised T&Cs, the completion of research security training is required for each “covered individual working on the award,” rather than “each individual employed by the recipient to work on the award.” The training requirement is annual. Certification can be made either by the institution or the covered individual on their own behalf. Regarding timing, per the T&Cs, “RST must have been completed either at the time of application, where applicable, or within the 12-month period immediately preceding the commencement of work on the award,” rather than the time of proposal as implemented by other federal agencies.
-
-
10.7 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) by a Country of Concern
-
The T&Cs previously indicated the following: By accepting an award from USDA, the recipient institution is certifying that “they are not currently, and will not in the future, enter into any subawards, contracts, or other agreements, or otherwise provide any form of benefit (material or non-material) through either funded or unfunded work to any foreign person, foreign entity, U.S. citizen, or U.S. entity, that is subject to FOCI by a FCOC or another foreign adversary.”
-
The revised T&Cs include language specifying that this term applies for the period of performance of the federal award and affects agreements “reasonably related to the federal award” In addition, the institution must certify that it, and any covered individuals, are not subject to FOCI and report subsequent discovery of this status within 5 days.
-
10.8 Disclosures
-
The revised T&Cs specify that “covered individuals” must complete and certify Common Forms (i.e., Biosketches and Current and Pending (Other) Support) in SciENcv, as opposed to “all employees of the recipient who work on the research award.”
-
Similarly, the recipient must provide supporting documentation for activities involving foreign entities reported as Current and Pending (Other) Support for “covered individuals”, “including copies of contracts, grants, or any other agreements specific to foreign appointments, employment with a foreign entity, or participation in a foreign talent recruitment program (FTRP)”. Per the revised T&Cs, by accepting the award, the recipient is certifying that they have reviewed the supporting documentation for compliance with USDA’s terms and conditions.
-
10.9 Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs (MFTRPs)
-
The revised T&Cs specify that “covered individuals” must certify to their non-participation in MFTRPs via the Common Forms, rather than “any individual employed to work on the research award.”
-
The revised T&Cs specify that , the recipient is certifying that no covered individuals have participated in an MFTRP within the past 10 years.The previous version of Section 10.9 did not indicate the specific mechanism for recipients to complete this certification.The revised version still includes the requirement for recipients to certify non-participation in MFTRPs – a variation from shorter timeframes adopted by other federal agencies.
-
NASA Announces Revised Disclosure Forms and Research Security Training
In accordance with Grant Information Circular 26-02, NASA has announced that beginning August 5, 2026, all covered individuals named on NASA grant and cooperative agreement proposals must attest that they have completed required research security training before a proposal can be submitted.
To meet this requirement, investigators will sign a new certification included in updated Biographical Sketch and Current & Pending (Other) Support forms. NASA has released advance copies of these updated forms so applicants can prepare, and the new research security training attestation is highlighted in the documents.
Important: Do not use the updated forms until August 5, 2026. Until then, applicants should continue using the current forms available on NASA's Grant Operations Management website.
Trusted CI Fellows Program
Call for Proposals: 2026 NSF Cybersecurity Summit: October 27-29, 2026
Trusted CI Fellowship applications are now open. This program brings together professionals and post-doctoral researchers to build practical cybersecurity knowledge for science and engineering.
Fellows gain practical approaches to identifying risks, strengthening research workflows, and communicating cybersecurity needs in ways that resonate with their teams and leadership. Many leave the program better equipped to influence practices, guide projects, and serve as a trusted resource within their communities.
Program Benefits
-
Participate in exclusive, online workshops, networking opportunities, and mentorship
-
Attend the NSF Cybersecurity Summit
-
Receive travel support covering transportation and accommodation expenses for attending the summit (detailed guidance will be provided upon acceptance)
More information about the program and application process is available on the website.
The call for proposals for the 2026 NSF Cybersecurity Summit, run by Trusted CI, is now open. The Summit will take place the week of October 26 at The Beckman Center in Irvine, California.
The NSF cyberinfrastructure ecosystem presents an aggregate of complex cybersecurity needs (e.g., scientific data and instruments, unique computational and storage resources, use of AI and automation, and complex collaborations). Going forward, research security will also bring new challenges to U.S. academic research institutions. This NSF Cybersecurity Summit community has a unique opportunity to develop information security practices tailored to these needs, as well as break new ground on efficient, effective ways to protect information assets while supporting science. The Summit brings together leaders in research cyberinfrastructure (CI), cybersecurity, and higher-ed researchers to build a trusting, collaborative community that addresses the community’s core cybersecurity challenges.
There are many ways to participate and contribute to the Summit community. Proposal opportunities include:
• Plenary Presentations (Due June 30)
• Workshops / Training Sessions (Due June 30)
• Birds of a Feather (BoFs) or Project Meetings (Due June 30)
• Posters (Due October 5)
• TLP or RED Talks (Due October 5)
These categories are meant as guidance; other creative or collaborative session ideas relevant to the Summit themes are also welcome.
First-time presenters are encouraged to submit proposals. The Summit organizers especially welcome submissions related to cybersecurity, research security, operational challenges, institutional implementation experiences, and community-driven collaboration across the NSF research ecosystem.
More information about the call for proposals can be found at: https://www.trustedci.org/2026-cfp .
Professional Association Resources & Reports
Professional Organizations Respond to OMB’s Proposed Revisions to UG
On May 29, 2026, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released proposed revisions to Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), including policies in 2 CFR part 200, commonly known as the Uniform Guidance.
Professional organizations have released a number of resources summarizing, analyzing, commenting on, and responding to the proposed revisions and their potential impacts to federal grant recipients, including those rleated to research security (e.g., 200.220). Available resources include:
-
COGR, AAU, and APLU "OMB Proposed Rule for Uniform Guidance: Immediate Considerations for Institutions"
-
COGR Side by Side Redline of UG Changes (COGR portal login required)
-
COGR's Redline of the UG, current vs. proposed (COGR portal login required)
-
COGR's Request to OMB for a comment period Extension,
-
COGR's June 2026 Membership Slide Presentation and Recording: Uniform Guidance Proposed Revisions: A First Look for Institutions
COGR Member Webinar on OMB Proposed Rule on Uniform Guidance - Legal Considerations
Registration is now open for COGR's member webinar "OMB Proposed Rule on Uniform Guidance: Legal Considerations" on June 23 from 1:00-2:30 pm ET. Per COGR’s announcement:
In addition to preparing comments on specific OMB proposals, institutions may be thinking about the following broader legal questions, which this session will address: (i) OMB’s authority to issue the full scope of proposed changes as binding regulation in a compressed timeline; (ii) the legal implications of certain key proposals (e.g., DEI and gender ideology terms, termination authority, and foreign collaborations); and (iii) what to do in preparation for a final rule that may be effective October 1, 2026.
Presenters: Emily Chi Fogler, Partner, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. and Marylana Saadeh Helou, Partner, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
FDP May 2026 Meeting Research Security Summary
The Federal Demonstration Partnership (FDP) held its in-person meeting from May 27-29, 2026, in Washington, D.C. Building on information provided in last week’s Briefing, following are summaries of some of the additional research security-related sessions included at the event.
FDP: Federal Agency Research Security Risk Assessments and International Co-authorship
Moderators:
Lisa Nichols, Executive Director, Research Security, University of Notre Dame
Jim Luther, Research Compliance Officer, Yale University
The FDP Research Security Subcommittee (RSS) held a session with panelists from various federal research funding agencies along with a representative from a major international publisher to discuss federal agency risk assessments and international co-authorship. Speakers included Michelle Bulls, Director, Office of Policy for Extramural Research Administration, National Institutes of Health (NIH); Sarah Stalker-Lehoux, Acting Chief of Research Security, Strategy and Policy, National Science Foundation (NSF); Julie Anderson, Director, Research Technology and Economic Security, Department of Energy (DOE); Jason Day, Research Policy Director, Department of Defense (DOD); and Ann Gabriel, Senior Vice President for Global Strategic Networks, Elsevier
Agencies discussed recent and pending updates to their processes and matrices for assessing research security risks for fundamental research proposals. These include the updated DOD matrix published on March 9, 2026, NIH’s reminder of the definition of foreign components published on May 27, 2026, and NSF’s planned move to a matrix format to align with other agencies.
There was discussion of DOD’s use of additional restricted lists in its risk assessment process for fundamental research proposals, from four lists to thirteen. NSF is considering using the same 13 lists and also considering one or two others currently included in pending legislation. NIH and DOE indicated their agencies would be considering whether to make this change. Per DOD, some of the lists are unlikely to be encountered in research. NSF suggested that trial runs with the additional lists were not resulting in a higher level of findings of collaboration with restricted entities. DOD suggested that investigators, when considering new collaborations, might review the 1286 list at a minimum, for a quick assessment of restrictions on potential research collaborations. In cases where there is engagement with restricted entities, researchers would be asked to end the engagement. Regarding requests from the Air Force for researchers to certify to the DoD risk matrix in its entirety, the Air Force is developing updated language that is more precise.
Michelle Bulls of NIH noted that the definition of a foreign component hasn’t changed. Co-authorship could be considered a foreign component as noted in NOT-OD-26-084. There was discussion on when conferring with foreign collaborators crosses the line to a collaboration. NIH welcomes suggestions from the community on additional case studies. Bulls noted that some Notices of Funding Opportunities will not allow foreign components and that associated publications would not be anticipated to have foreign co-authors. There was discussion that requests from program officers to remove foreign co-authors from publications based on the citation of NIH grants without prior approval for a foreign component (e.g., if the foreign co-author was not associated with the NIH-funded research and prior approval was therefore not requested) were not consistent with NIH policy. NIH will be enforcing the Stevens amendment which requires that agency funding be cited where it supported work in a publication.
In addition to expanding the number of restricted lists, NSF will be moving to a risk matrix format and expects to publish an additional matrix for SBIRs/STTRs in FY27. NSF is likely to continue its focus on current collaborations identified in disclosures, rather than looking back using publications. The agency anticipates having a public comment period. DOD will continue to look back to understand relationships with foreign parties.
Ann Gabriel of Elsevier discussed the publication proxy problem: Publications are a lagging indicator. In addition, students and postdocs who performed work in the U.S. often list subsequent foreign affiliations; co-authors may not have communicated or worked together, instead working only with the corresponding author or editor; funding may not be properly attributed, and other issues arise. Many publishers require authors to list the affiliation where the research was conducted, not where the author is affiliated at the time of publication. The FDP RSS will continue engaging with publishers and agencies to identify standards and guidance to better enforce and appropriately affiliate and acknowledge funding support. It was suggested that proposal-stage disclosure is a richer, more timely risk signal than publication metadata.
Regarding a federal-wide definition of “collaboration”, the draft Uniform Guidance (UG) published on May 28, and draft legislation include definitions of collaboration. Research funding agencies are discussing a common definition but also waiting for outcomes with respect to UG and legislative efforts with the hope of coming to consensus in the fall.
FDP: Federal Research Security Update
The Moderators:
Lisa Nichols, Executive Director, Research Security, University of Notre Dame
Jim Luther, Research Compliance Officer, Yale University
The FDP Research Security Subcommittee (RSS) held a session with panelists from federal research funding agencies to discuss the latest research security policies, requirements and resources. Speakers included Michelle Bulls, Director, Office of Policy for Extramural Research Administration, National Institutes of Health (NIH); Sarah Stalker-Lehoux, Acting Chief of Research Security, Strategy and Policy, National Science Foundation (NSF); Julie Anderson, Director, Research Technology and Economic Security, Department of Energy (DOE); and Jason Day, Research Policy Director, Department of Defense (DOD).
Michelle Bulls highlighted the April 22, 2026, SciENcv release of a new version of the NIH Common Forms (see NOT-OD-26-079). The forms include certification that applicants are not part of a Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program and that research security training has been completed within 12 months of application submission. Michelle Bulls indicated that agencies will be discussing whether to require annual certification for training (an annual training requirement). Jason Day indicated that DoD will publish a training policy and require RS training by Oct. 1, 2026.
Michelle Bulls noted that Other Significant Contributors (OSC) are not senior/key personnel but there is a longstanding requirement for OSC to submit a Biosketch. With NIH’s implementation of the Common Forms in SciENcv, OSC cannot generate a Biosketch without completing the certification. Bulls indicated that NIH recognizes that the full certification statement (e.g., MFTRP and RST) does not apply to OSC and will consider modifications to remove requirements that do not apply.
Regarding monetary donations, it was suggested that NIH will be rolling back some examples of what needs to be disclosed in current and pending support. Per the presentation:
-
When a monetary donation is given to an institution or directly to senior/key personnel , it must be disclosed.
-
NIH has posted examples but recognizes that these disclosures do not fit in the categories of Current and Pending (Other) Support.
-
NIH is exploring a supplemental attachment to collect disclosures of monetary donations recognizing that they are not always Other Support.
-
NIH provided examples of Monetary Donations that Must be Disclosed
Slides from the session, with the examples, will be shared once available. Additional guidance on gifts is expected to be published by NIH indicating when gifts would be reportable, e.g., if there are expectations such as reporting requirements.
DOE reported that the agency is doing more in terms of clarifications and mitigations. On the topic of research security programs (RSP), agencies engaged with FDP on the development of cybersecurity effective practices. There is broad informal agreement by agencies on the path forward for implementation of RSP requirements which are currently with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for review and approval. NSF discussed that when rolling out updated research security policies, the agency may require certification for all proposals that researchers are not collaborating with proscribed (restricted) parties.
There was discussion about the Uniform Guidance (UG) draft 200.220 (May 28, 2026) which establishes a government-wide rule prohibiting recipients/subrecipients from using Federal funds to support bilateral or multilateral collaborations, agreements, programs, or activities with covered foreign countries or entities, unless expressly authorized by Federal statute or approved by the agency. Additional information on the UG and potential research security impacts will be provided elsewhere in this and upcoming briefings.
An overview from the NSF SECURE Center highlighted current and upcoming resources. These include: the shared virtual environment community forum which allows research security leads and related roles to discuss emerging topics and issues with colleagues and share information and resources; risk assessment frameworks and travel information; and a weekly research security briefing with the latest news, policy information, resources, and Center opportunities. In addition, a new annual research security training module, to be released in June, reduces training time to 30 minutes while meeting federal requirements, providing additional information and case studies, and addresses questions the Center has received in discussions with researchers. FDP members were provided the link to connect and engage with the Center.
On June 5, 2026, the Association of American Universities (AAU) posted a response to the DETERRENT Act urging the Senate to reject the proposed legislation. AAU argues the bill would effectively end academic engagement with China and severely chill collaboration with other countries, isolating the United States from the global science community and threatening student exchanges, language instruction, and non-sensitive research partnerships. Among the bill's more controversial provisions, it would require universities to obtain a waiver from the Secretary of Education before entering into any contract with a country of concern and would compel faculty and staff to individually report foreign gifts over $480 to a publicly available and searchable database. AAU warns that this threshold could expose scholars to harassment and politically motivated attacks. The piece contends that robust foreign gift and contract disclosure requirements are already in place under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, and that the DETERRENT Act largely duplicates existing requirements while adding sweeping new administrative burdens. AAU calls instead for targeted reforms to improve the Department of Education's existing public dashboard, and argues that the path to a secure research enterprise lies in open but risk-based engagement and not across-the-board restrictions.
AAU Responds to DETERRENT Act
Research Security News, Reports & Events
Please note, articles linked below may require a subscription to view.
NSF SECURE Center cannot distribute copies of subscription-based articles.
Looking forward to seeing you at Clemson University this summer!
New NSF SECURE Analytics Advisory: "PRC Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs Test US Research Security"
NSF SECURE Analytics has announced the release of its third advisory "PRC Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs Test US Research Security."
Research security is evolving as global competition for scientific talent intensifies. This new NSF SECURE Analytics advisory examines how PRC foreign talent recruitment strategies are adapting, why compliance alone may not fully address research security risks, and how the U.S. research community can respond with holistic security practices, agile due diligence, and stronger competitive research ecosystems.
A timely read for research leaders, compliance professionals, and anyone working to safeguard the openness, integrity, and security of the research enterprise.
South Korea to Establish Dedicated Research Security Organizations in Universities
(Asia Business Daily, 6/5/2026)
South Korea's Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has launched the "Research Security Capability Enhancement Support Project," a government initiative designed to help universities build dedicated research security infrastructure amid the growing risks posed by expanding international research collaboration. Eight universities will be selected -- four in the Seoul metropolitan area and four regional universities. Each university will receive annual funding of up to 500 million won (about $327,000) through December 2028. Participating institutions are expected to establish dedicated security units and trained personnel, develop systems to proactively identify risks arising from international partnerships, and provide members with updated security manuals, education programs, and access to legal and intellectual property expertise. (more)
How to put theory into practice for IHE research security
(University World News, 6/3/2026)
A recent conference convened by the Berlin University Alliance examined Germany's evolving research security framework and its implications for international academic collaboration. The German Science and Humanities Council's 2025 position paper called for a multi-layered system spanning university-level risk assessment, national advisory agencies, and a proposed National Platform for Knowledge Security to coordinate with governmental and intelligence actors, which the Federal Ministry of Research has since officially announced. Delegates emphasized building on existing structures such as export control offices and ethics commissions rather than duplicating them and flagged the emergence of a new institutional role: the research security coordinator, requiring interdisciplinary expertise and case-by-case judgment. The conference participants noted that leadership commitment and a broad institutional culture of shared responsibility are required for research security and global engagement to be achieved simultaneously. (more)
RISC Bulletin
Texas A&M University’s Research and Innovation Security and Competitiveness (RISC) Institute disseminates weekly RISC Media Bulletins, covering topics related to research security, foreign influence, and the intersection of science, technology, and national security. To join the distribution list for the RISC Bulletin or view previous editions, click here.
NSF SECURE Opportunities, Updates & Resources
NSF SECURE Center Authorship Resources Feedback Forum
Registration is open for the NSF SECURE Center Authorship Resources Feedback Forum: a hands-on, interactive session designed to gather meaningful input on a new suite of authorship resources. Participants will collaborate to review these tools and provide feedback to help refine and strengthen their effectiveness. These resources are designed to provide guidance to researchers and research security professionals to navigate authorship decisions and disclosures. They include an authorship checklist for researchers and authorship risk assessment considerations for research security professionals.
Participants will receive access to the resources one week before the session. During the session, participants will:
-
Explore the resources as a group
-
Share feedback on content clarity, logic, design, usability, and how well it fits their needs
-
Discuss practical use cases and suggest improvements
-
Engage directly with the team building the tool to help guide its next steps
The goal of this session is to make sure the resources are intuitive, effective, and aligned with real‑world needs by involving stakeholders early and giving them space to influence its development.
Event Details:
-
Dates & Times: Multiple sessions are offered. Participants only need to register for one session.
-
June 25, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. (ET)
-
June 26, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. (ET)
-
-
Location: Virtual (Zoom)
-
Intended Audience: Research Security professionals (e.g., RSOs) and Researchers
-
Capacity: Each session is limited to 25 participants to support meaningful discussion and engagement.
-
Format: This is not a passive presentation. Attendees should expect active participation through open discussion and hands-on virtual activities. Multiple sessions are offered to accommodate schedules. Each session will cover the same content. Participants only need to register for one session.
-
Access: To support deeper engagement, participants will receive access to the prototype one week before the session, allowing additional time to explore the tool and prepare feedback.
Hear What Participants are Saying about the NSF SECURE Center Mentorship Program
The NSF SECURE Center Research Security Mentorship Program was developed to provide structured professional development through sustained engagement between experienced practitioners and professionals building or expanding research security programs at their institutions. In a field that is rapidly evolving and lacks standardized implementation models, the program creates opportunities for participants to discuss real-world challenges, share practical solutions, and learn from one another's experiences in a confidential and supportive environment.
The Mentorship pilot program kicked off March 2nd with eight pairings. This video features feedback from participants highlighting the significant value of the program. Mentors and mentees consistently describe the mentorship experience as a way to build a strong sense of professional community and develop meaningful networks with colleagues at peer institutions. Participants emphasize the mutual exchange of knowledge and experience, noting that both mentors and mentees benefit from the relationship. The program provides opportunities to benchmark approaches across organizations, discuss emerging challenges, identify best practices, and develop practical guidance for investigators. Participants also value having candid conversations with trusted peers who understand the unique complexities of research security, helping them navigate institutional challenges and strengthen their programs with greater confidence.
The pilot is demonstrating that mentorship not only accelerates individual professional growth but also contributes to a stronger, more connected research security community capable of advancing the field through collaboration and shared expertise.
REMINDER: Your input is needed - NSF SECURE Center community survey (15-20 minutes)
If you have already completed the NSF SECURE Center Community Survey, thank you for your participation. We greatly appreciate your feedback!
If you have not yet had a chance to participate, we invite you to do so. The survey takes approximately 15 minutes and is designed to help us understand the research security community's familiarity with the NSF SECURE Center's tools and resources, identify potential gaps, and better understand ongoing challenges. Your perspective is important and will help inform future SECURE Center efforts.
Survey details:
-
Estimated time: 15–20 minutes
-
Responses will be reported only in aggregate (no personally identifiable information will be shared)
-
The survey will remain open through June 19, 2026
-
Survey Link: https://uwashington.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9odKbV1itDxBvo2
Trending Topics in the Shared Virtual Environment (SVE) Discussion Forum
Research security professionals across the country share questions, challenges, and practices in the NSF SECURE Center SVE’s discussion forum. Each week we highlight a few conversations worth knowing about.
This week, users have been discussing a community member alert regarding faculty being contacted by a potential malign actor, and the RSO’s role in cybersecurity compliance. Head over to the Community Forum to join in.
NSF SECURE Center YouTube Channel
The NSF SECURE Center YouTube channel is a growing hub for research security education and community engagement, featuring webinars, training content, expert discussions, and presentations on a wide variety of topics. The channel provides practical, accessible resources for researchers, research administrators, compliance professionals, and institutional leaders seeking to strengthen research security programs while supporting open scientific collaboration. Whether you're new to research security or looking to stay current on emerging issues and best practices, the channel offers valuable insights from subject matter experts across the research community.
NSF SECURE Center Calendar of Events
Each week the NSF SECURE Center hosts events through the National and Regional Centers, including co-creation workshops, educational, and engagement sessions with the research community. The events calendar provides more information about these opportunities and more.
Previous NSF SECURE Center Research Security Briefings
2026 issues of the Research Security Briefing are available on the NSF SECURE Center website.
A combined, searchable version of all 2025 issues of the Briefing is also available.
The NSF SECURE Center will host a free virtual webinar on June 16, 2026, at 11:00am PT (12:00pm MT, 1:00pm CT, 2:00pm ET). Join us as James Noble, FBI Unit Chief of the Counterintelligence & Espionage Division, discusses how China’s centralized, state-directed strategy targets technology and research assets across sectors, and how strengthening awareness and partnerships across academia, industry, and government can help disrupt these threats. The presentation will include moderated discussion and audience Q&A by the SECURE Center's Amy Brenneke. NOTE: This webinar will not be recorded and slides will not be made available, so please plan to attend if you would like to view the content. Registration is open via this link.
SPARK + FBI Webinar: China - Technology Transfer Threat Through Recruitment and Talent Plans
SECURE Programming: Advancing Research Knowledge (SPARK) webinars are free, interactive, virtual webinars designed to help the research security community better understand and implement requirements, resources, and best practices.
Upcoming NSF SECURE Center SPARK Webinars
Registration Open: SPARK + FBI Webinar: China’s Virtual Targeting Strategy: What You Need to Know
The NSF SECURE Center will host a free virtual webinar on August 25, 2026, at 11:00am PT (12:00pm MT, 1:00pm CT, 2:00pm ET). Join us as Joshua Obstfeld, FBI Counterintelligence Senior Executive for External Engagement, discusses how China’s intelligence services use professional networking platforms, online job boards, and virtual recruitment strategies to identify and target individuals with access to sensitive, proprietary, and non-public information. The presentation will explore how intelligence officers and affiliated actors pose as recruiters, consultants, and research organizations to establish relationships and solicit information on behalf of undisclosed clients connected to the Chinese government. The presentation will include moderated discussion and audience Q&A by the SECURE Center’s Lori Schultz. NOTE: This webinar will not be recorded and slides will not be made available, so please plan to attend if you would like to view the content. Registration is open via this link.
Other News & Resources
Invitation to Participate: NSF SECURE Analytics Research Security Operations Survey - ASCE '27 Registration Drawing
NSF SECURE Analytics is seeking input from U.S. research organizations of how they evaluate, procure, and price research security tools and services — including software platforms, data subscriptions, and managed or analyst-supported solutions.
The confidential survey (between 12-18 minutes to complete) does not include any questions regarding proprietary contract terms — ranges and directional estimates are entirely sufficient. Responses will be used only in aggregate to inform the development of tools and resources that benefit the broader research security community.
At the conclusion of the survey, there is an optional drawing for one of 2 in-person or 5 virtual registrations to the 2027 Academic Security and Counter Exploitation (ASCE) Conference, hosted by the Texas A&M Research & Innovation Security & Competitiveness (RISC) Institute. Winners will be notified by November 1. Take the survey at https://tx.ag/SAsurvey0626
Opportunity to Participate in an NSF-funded Study on Research Security
Recruitment is underway for participants to share their experiences on research (cyber)security at U.S. institutions of higher education. This NSF-funded study is led by Carolyn Ellis (carolynellis@asu.edu), Lead of the Regulated Research Community of Practice (RRCoP) with Arizona State University, and Dr. Jennifer Linvill (jlinvill@purdue.edu), Assistant Professor at Purdue University.
The research team is hoping to learn more about the national picture of institutional research cybersecurity readiness by mapping federal policy expectations, synthesizing institutional practices, and identifying implementation patterns. The researchers will document how institutions interpret government policy (i.e., National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, or NSPM-33), coordinate governance and ownership, and structure training and assessment. Results will inform future recommendations that highlight readiness pathways and identify opportunities for coordination, support, or shared infrastructure.
If you are an IT cybersecurity or research security professional or a CISO interested in informing this study with a 60-minute audio-recorded interview via Microsoft Teams, please schedule an interview time here via Calendly. This is human subjects research and has been categorized as exempt research under the Purdue Internal Review Board protocol number IRB-2025-1361.
Opportunity to Participate in an NSF-funded Study on AI Research Security
Recruitment is underway for participants to share their experiences on research security as part of TRAILS (Typology of Research on Artificial Intelligence Lifecycle Security), a two-year NSF-funded study on AI research security.
If you are (1) an AI researcher or researcher who uses AI, (2) an IT, SOC, or cybersecurity professional, or (3) a compliance or export control professional, then you could receive a $100 Amazon gift card by completing a 60–90-minute audio-recorded interview via Zoom.
If you are interested in sharing your experience, please complete this short, four-questions survey to check your eligibility for participation.
If you have additional questions, feel free to reach out to Rockwell (“Rocky”) Clancy (rfclancy@vt.edu) on behalf of the TRAILS teams (Qin Zhu, John Talerico, and Lisa Lee).
Community Job Postings
Please note, postings linked below are time-limited in nature.
Were you forwarded this edition of the Research Security Briefing? Subscribe here.
Looking to participate in NSF SECURE Center co-creation activities or contribute to weekly briefings?
Contact info@secure-center.org or sign up here.
The information provided by the NSF SECURE Center is intended for general research and educational purposes only. While we strive to ensure the accuracy and reliability of our content, we do not guarantee its completeness, timeliness, or applicability to specific circumstances. Each user is responsible for conducting their own risk assessments and making decisions based on independent judgment.
Further, the NSF SECURE Center does not provide professional or legal advice, and users are encouraged to consult qualified professionals before making decisions based on the information found here. The NSF SECURE Center shall not be liable for any damages or costs of any type arising out of or in any way connected with your use of this information. External links are provided for convenience and do not constitute an endorsement of the content or services offered by any third-party resources.
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Cooperative Agreement No. 2403771. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. National Science Foundation or other U.S. Government Agencies.